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ABSTRACT 
Generally traffic and the sensor network security have many challenges in the transmission of data in the 
network. The existing schemes consider homogeneous sensor networks which have poor performance and 
scalability. Due to many-to-one traffic pattern, sensors may communicate with small portion of its 
neighbours. Key management is the critical process in sensor nodes to secure the data. Most existing 
schemes establish shared keys for all the sensors no matter whether they are communicating or not. 
Hence it leads to large storage overhead. Another problem in sensor network is compromised node attack 
and denial of service attack which occurs because of its wireless nature. Existing multi path routing 
algorithms are vulnerable to these attacks. So once an adversary acquires the routing algorithm, it can 
compute the same routes known to the source, and hence endanger all information sent over these routes. 
If an adversary performs node compromise attack, they can easily get the encryption/ decryption keys 
used by that node and hence they can intercept the information easily. 
               In this paper we are proposing a key management scheme which only establishes shared keys 
with their communicating neighbour and a mechanism to generate randomized multipath routes for 
secure transmission of data to the sink. Here we are adopting heterogeneous sensor networks and we are 
utilizing elliptic curve cryptography for efficient key management which is more efficient, scalable, and 
highly secure and reduces communication overhead. The routes generated by our mechanism are highly 
dispersive, energy efficient and making them quite capable of bypassing the back holes at low energy 
cost.  
 
KEYWORDS 
Wireless Sensor Network, Non-Repetitive random propagation (NRRP) and Multi cat tree assisted random 
propagation (MTRP)  
1. INTRODUCTION 
WIRELESS sensor networks have applications in many areas, such as military, homeland 
security, health care, environment, agriculture, manufacturing, and so on.  In  the past  several  
years,  sensor  networks  have  been  a  very  active  research  area.  Most  previous  research  
efforts  consider homogeneous sensor  networks,  where  all  sensor  nodes  have the same 
capabilities. However, a homogeneous ad hoc net-work suffers from poor fundamental limits 
and performance. Research has demonstrated its performance bottleneck both theoretically and 
through simulation experiments and test bed measurements. Several recent works studied 
Heterogeneous Sensor Networks (HSNs), where sensor nodes have different capabilities in 
terms of communication, computation, energy supply, storage space, reliability and other 
aspects. 
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Key management is an essential cryptographic primitive upon which other security primitives 
are built. Due to resource constraints, achieving such key agreement in wireless sensor networks 
is non-trivial. In Eschenauer and Gligor first present a key management scheme for sensor 
networks based on probabilistic key pre-distribution. Several other key pre-distribution schemes 
have been proposed. Probabilistic key pre-distribution is a promising scheme for key 
management in sensor networks. To ensure such a scheme works well, the probability that each 
sensor shares at least one key with a neighbour sensor (referred to as key-sharing probability) 
should be high. 
The above discussion shows that many existing key management schemes require a large 
storage space for key pre-distribution and are not suitable for small sensor nodes. Of the various 
possible security threats that may be experienced by a wireless sensor network (WSN), in this 
paper we are specifically interested in combating two types of attacks: the compromised-node 
(CN) attack and the denial-of-service (DOS) attack. The CN attack refers to the situation when 
an adversary physically compromises a subset of nodes to eavesdrop information, whereas in 
the DOS attack, the adversary interferes with the normal operation of the WSN by actively 
disrupting, changing, or even destroying the functionality of a subset of nodes in the system. 
These two attacks are similar in the sense that they both generate black holes: areas within 
which the adversary can either passively intercept or actively block information delivery. Due to 
the unattended nature of WSNs, adversaries can easily produce such black holes. Severe CN and 
DOS attacks can disrupt normal data delivery between sensor nodes and the sink, or even 
partition the topology. A conventional cryptography-based security method cannot alone 
provide satisfactory solutions to these problems. This is because, by definition, once a node is 
compromised, the adversary can always acquire the encryption/decryption keys of that node, 
and thus can intercept any information passed through it. At the same time, an adversary can 
always perform certain form of DOS attack (e.g., jamming) even if it does not have any 
knowledge of the crypto-system used in the WSN. 
         One remedial solution to these attacks is to exploit the network’s routing functionality. 
Specifically, if the locations of the black holes formed by the compromised (or jammed) nodes 
are known a priori, then information can be delivered over paths that circumvent (bypass) these 
holes, whenever possible. In practice, due to the difficulty of acquiring such location 
information, the above idea is implemented in a probabilistic manner, typically through a two-
step process: secret sharing and multi-path routing. 
   We argue that three security problems exist in the counter-attack approach. First, this 
approach is no longer valid if the adversary can selectively compromise or jam nodes. This is 
because the route computation in the above multi-path routing algorithms is deterministic in the 
sense that for a fixed topology, a fixed set of routes is always computed by the routing 
algorithm for given source and destination. Therefore, even if the shares can be distributed over 
different routes, overall they are always delivered over the same set of routes that are 
computable by the algorithm. As a result, once the routing algorithm becomes open to the 
adversary (this can be done, e.g., through a memory interrogation of the compromised nodes), 
the adversary can by itself compute the set of routes for any given source and destination. Then 
the adversary can pinpoint to one particular node in each route and compromise (or jam) these 
nodes. Such an attack can intercept all shares of the information, rendering the above counter-
attack approaches ineffective. Second, as pointed out in, actually very few node-disjoint routes 
can be found when node density is moderate and source and destination nodes are several hops 
apart. For example, for a node degree of 8, on average only two node-disjoint routes can be 
found between a source and a destination that are at least 7 hops apart. There is also a 30% 
possibility that no node-disjoint paths can be found between the source and the destination. The 
lack of enough routes significantly undermines the security performance of this multi-path 
approach. Last, even worse, because the set of routes is computed under certain constraints, the 
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routes may not be spatially dispersive enough to circumvent a moderate-sized black hole. 
            In this paper, we present an efficient key management scheme and a randomized 
multipath routing algorithm that only needs small storage space less energy consumption.          
Contribution of this paper is of three folds.  First, we utilize the C-neighbour concept and a key 
management scheme for power full sensors. Second, establishing keys among sensors using 
ECC public key cryptosystem. Third, developing distributed multipath routing algorithms based 
on the information available to the sensors. The schemes proposed are Non-Repetitive random 
propagation (NRRP) and Multi cat tree assisted random propagation (MTRP). The rest of the 
paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the proposed key management scheme. 
Section III describes the proposed multi path routing algorithm. Section IV describes the 
simulation results of the proposed schemes. Section V describes the conclusion. 
2. PROPOSED KEY MANAGEMENT SCHEME 
2.1 The Cluster Formation 
 
After sensor deployment, clusters are formed in an HSN. We have designed an efficient 
clustering scheme for HSNs in. Because of the page limit, we will not describe the details of the 
clustering scheme here. For the simplicity of discussion, assume that each H-sensor can 
communicate directly with its neighbour H-sensors (if not, then relay via L-sensors can be 
used). All H-sensors form a backbone in an HSN. After cluster formation, an HSN is divided 
into multiple clusters, where H-sensors serve as the cluster heads. An illustration of the cluster 
formation is shown in Figure 1, where the small squares are L-sensors, large rectangular nodes 
are H-sensors, and the large square at the bottom-left corner is the sink. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Cluster Formation in HSN 
 
2.2 Distributed Key Establishment 
 
The key setup can also be done in a distributed way. In the distributed key establishment, 
each L-sensor is pre-loaded with a pair of ECC keys - a private key and a public key. When an 
L-sensor (denoted as u) sends its locations information to its cluster head H, u computes a 
Message Authentication Code (MAC) over the message by using u’s private key, and the MAC 
is appended to message. When H receives the message, H can verify the MAC and then 
authenticate u’s identify, by using u’s public key. Then H generates a certificate (denoted as 
CAu) for u’s public key by using H’s private key. 
After determining the routing tree structure in a cluster, the cluster head H disseminates the 
tree structure (i.e., parent-child relationship) and the corresponding public key certificate to each 
L-sensor. The public key certificates are signed by H’s private key, and can be verified by every 
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L-sensor, since each L-sensor is preloaded with H’s public key. A public key certificate proves 
the authenticity of a public key and further proves the identity of one L-sensor to another L-
sensor. 
If two L-sensors are parent and child in the routing tree, then they are c-neighbours of each 
other, and they will set up a shared key by themselves. For each pair of c-neighbours, the sensor 
with smaller node ID initiates the key establishment process. For example, suppose that L-
sensor u and v are c-neighbours and u has a smaller ID than v. The process is presented below: 
1) Node u  sends its public key KuU  = IuP  to v.  
2) Node v  sends its public key KvU  = IvP  to u.  
3) Node  u   generates  the  shared  key  by  multiplying  its  
private key Iu with v’s public key - KvU , i.e., Ku,v = KuRKvU = IuIvP ; similarly, v generates 
the shared key 
= KvRKuU  = IuIvP . 
After the above process, nodes u and v share a common key and they can start secure 
communications. To reduce the computation overhead, symmetric encryption algorithms are 
used among L-sensors. Note that in the distributed key establishment scheme, the assumption of 
having tamper-resistant hardware in H-sensors can be removed. 
3. PROPOSED RANDOMIZED MULTIPATH ALGORITHM 
3.1. Overview 
 
     As illustrated in Figure 2, we consider a 3-phase approach for secure information delivery in 
a WSN: secret sharing of information, randomized propagation of each information share, and 
normal routing (e.g., min-hop routing) toward the sink. More specifically, when a sensor node 
wants to send a packet to the sink, it first breaks the packet into M shares according to a (T; M)-
threshold secret sharing algorithm, e.g., the Shamir’s algorithm. Each share is then transmitted 
to some randomly picked neighbor. That neighbor will continue to relay the share it has 
received to other randomly picked neighbors, and so on. In each information share, there is a 
TTL field, whose initial value is set by the source node to control the total number of 
randomized relays. After each relay, the TTL field is reduced by 1. When the TTL count 
reaches 0, the final node receiving this share stops the random propagation phase and begins to 
route this share towards the sink using normal single-path routing. Once the sink collects at least 
T shares, it can inversely compute the original information. No information can be recovered 
from less than T shares. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Randomized Dispersive routes 
 
  
International Journal of Distributed and Parallel Systems (IJDPS) Vol.3, No.1, January 2012 
223 
 
 
 
  Because routes are randomly generated, there is no guarantee that different routes are still 
node-disjoint. However, the algorithm should ensure that the randomly generated routes are as 
dispersive as possible, i.e., different routes are geographically separated as far as possible such 
that they have high likelihood of not simultaneously passing through a black hole. Considering 
the stringent requirement on energy consumptions in WSNs, the major challenge in our design 
is to generate highly dispersive random routes at low energy cost.As explained later, such a 
challenge is not trivial. A naive algorithm of generating random routes, such as Wanderer 
scheme (a pure random-walk algorithm), only leads to long paths (containing many hops, and 
therefore, consuming much energy) without achieving good dispersive ness. Due to security 
considerations, we also require that the route computation be implemented in a distributed way, 
such that the final route represents the aggregate decision of all the nodes participating in route 
selection. As a result, a small number of colluding/compromised nodes cannot dominate the 
selection result. In addition, for efficiency purposes, we also require that the randomized route 
selection algorithm only incurs a small amount of communication overhead. Needless to say, 
the random propagation phase is the key component that dictates the security and energy 
performance of the entire mechanism.  
3.2. Random propagation of Information Shares 
To diversify routes, an ideal random propagation algorithm propagates information shares as 
dispersive as possible. Typically, this means propagating the share farther from its source. At 
the same time, it is highly desirable to have an energy-efficient propagation, which calls for 
limiting the number of randomly propagated hops. The challenge here lies in the random and 
distributed nature of the propagation: a share may be sent one-hop farther from its source in a 
given step, but may be sent back closer to the source in the next step, wasting both steps from 
the security’s point of view. To tackle this issue, some control needs to be imposed on the 
random propagation process to ensure that in each step the share is more likely to be forwarded 
outwards from the source. We develop four distributed random propagation mechanisms, which 
approach this goal in various degrees. 
Non-repetitive Random Propagation: NRRP is based on PRP, but it improves the propagation 
efficiency by recording all the nodes that the propagation has traversed so far. More specifically, 
NRRP adds a “node-in-route” (NIR) field to the header of each share. Initially, this field is 
empty. Starting from the source node, whenever a node propagates the share to the next hop, the 
id of the up-stream node is appended to the share’s NIR field. Nodes included in NIR are 
excluded from the random pick of the next hop of propagation. This non-repetitive propagation 
guarantees that the share will be relayed to a different node in each step of random propagation, 
leading to better propagation efficiency.  
    Multicast Tree-assisted Random Propagation: The MTRP scheme aims at actively 
improving the energy efficiency of random propagation while preserving the dispersiveness of 
DRP. The basic idea comes from the following observation of Figure 2: Among the 3 different 
routes taken by the shares, the route on the bottom right is the most energy efficient because it 
has the shortest end-to-end path. So, in order to improve energy efficiency, the shares should be 
best propagated in the direction of the sink. In other words, their propagation should be 
restricted to the right half of the circle in Figure 2.  
Conventionally, directional routing requires location information of both the source and the 
destination nodes, and sometimes the intermediate nodes. Examples of this type of location-
based routing are GPSR (Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing) and LAR (Location-Aided 
Routing). Location in-formation mainly relies on GPS in each node, or on some distributed 
localization algorithms. The high cost and the low accuracy of localization are the main 
drawbacks of these two methods, respectively. 
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MTRP involves directionality in its propagation process without needing location information. 
More specifically, after the deployment of the WSN, MTRP requires that the sink constructs a 
multicast tree from itself to every node in the network. Such a tree-construction operation is not 
unusual in existing protocols, and is typically conducted via flooding a “hello” message from 
the sink to every node. Once this multicast tree is constructed, a node knows its distance (in 
number of hops) to the sink and the id of its parent node. We assume that each entry in the 
neighbor list maintained by a node has a field recording the number of hops to the sink from the 
corresponding neighbor. Under MTRP, the header of each share contains two additional fields: 
maxhop and minhop. The values of these two parameters are set by the source to maxhop = ns + α1 
and minhop = ns - α2, where ns is the hop count from the source to the sink, and α1 and α2 are 
nonnegative integers with α1 ≤ α2. The parameter α1 controls the limit that a share can be 
propagated away from the sink, i.e., to the left half of the circle in Figure 1. The parameter α2 
controls the propagation area toward the sink, i.e., the right half of the circle. A small α2 makes 
the propagation of a share be dispersed away from the centre line connecting the source and the 
link and forces them to take the side path, leading to better dispersion. 
Before a node begins to pick the next relaying node from its neighbor list, it first filters out 
neighbors that are in the LHNL, just as in the case of DRP. Next, it filters out nodes that have a 
hop count to the sink greater than maxhop or smaller than minhop. The next relaying node will be 
randomly drawn from the remaining neighbors. In case the set of remaining nodes after the first 
step is empty, the second step will be directly applied to the entire set of neighbors. 
4. SIMULATION RESULTS 
4.1. Performance Evaluation of Key Management Scheme 
        In this Section, we present the performance evaluation results of the ECC-based key 
management scheme (referred to as the ECC scheme below). The key pre-distribution scheme 
proposed by Eschenauer and Gligor [6] is used for comparison, and it is referred to as the E-G 
scheme. 
    Table 1: Performance Evaluation 
 
 
4.2. Evaluation of Multi Path Routing Algorithm 
 
 We first fix the location of the source node at (¡50; 0). In Figures 3 and 4, we plot the packet 
interception probability as a function of the TTL value (N) and the number of shares (M) that 
each packet is broken into, respectively. These figures show that increasing N and M helps 
reduce the packet interception probability for all proposed schemes. However, for a sufficiently 
large N, (e.g., N = 20 in Figure 3), the interception probability does not change much with a 
further increase in N. This is because the random propagation process has reached steady state. 
It can also be observed that, in all cases, the packet interception probabilities under the DRP, 
NRRP, and MTRP schemes are much smaller than that of the baseline PRP scheme, because 
Schemes Storage Space Energy Consumption Security 
Basic Scheme m (M + N) where m 
depends on the key 
pool size P 
 
With the key pool size 
p=10000, the probability 
of sharing is 90% 
When more keys are 
pre-loaded in a sensor, 
the compromising 
probability is high. (i.e) 
less resilient to node 
compromise attack 
Distributed Key 
Setup 
3M + 2N where M is 
the number of H 
Sensors and N is the 
number of L Sensors 
Establishes keys only 
between the c-neighbors 
Compromising 
probability is always 
zero. Since each L-
sensor uses a distinctive 
public/private key pair. 
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their random propagations are more efficient. In addition, when N and M are large, all four 
randomized algorithms achieve smaller packet interception probabilities than the deterministic 
H-SPREAD scheme. In many cases, the gap is more than one order of magnitude. We plot the 
packet interception probability as a function of the size of the black hole in Figure 5. It is clear 
that the interception probability increases with Re. 
In Figure 6 we study the impact of node connectivity. The number of nodes is changed from 
1000 to 3000, corresponding to changing the average node connectivity degree from 8 to 24. It 
can be observed that, in general, the packet interception probabilities of the four proposed 
schemes do not change significantly with node connectivity. Such insensitivity to node 
connectivity/density is because the packet interception probability is mainly decided by how 
dispersive the shares can be geographically after random propagation. As long as nodes are 
uniformly distributed, a change in node density does not impact the geographic distribution of 
the shares after random propagation. 
In Figure 7, we slide the x-coordinate of the source node along the line y = 0 to evaluate the 
packet interception probabilities at different source locations in the network. A segmented trend 
can be observed: when the source is far away from the black hole, shares are mainly intercepted 
during the normal routing phase. Note that during the normal routing phase, all paths start to 
converge geographically to the sink (see Figure 3). As a result, the closer the source is to the 
black hole, the less convergent the paths will be at the black hole, so the lower interception 
probability. However, when the source is close to the black hole, i.e., x ¸ 0, the trend in the 
interception probability is reversed. This is because more and more shares are intercepted during 
the propagation phase. When x = 50, which corresponds to the scenario where the source is 
placed right at the center of the black hole, the interception probabilities reach their maximum 
value. After that, they decrease quickly as the source gets farther away from the black hole. In 
all segments, the packet interception probabilities of the DRP, NRRP, and MTRP schemes are 
smaller than that of H-SPREAD. 
         We evaluate the average number of hops of the end-to-end route as a function of the TTL 
value in Figure 8. It can be observed that the hop-count under PRP, DRP, and NRRP increases 
linearly with N, while the hop-count under MTRP only increases slowly with N. The TTL value 
does not play a role in the H-SPREAD scheme. Under large N, e.g., when N = 25, the 
randomized algorithm achieves better security performance than H-SPREAD. However, the 
hop-count of H-SPREAD is about 1=3 of that of PRP, DRP, and NRRP, and about 1=2 of that 
of MTRP scheme. The relatively large hop-count in the randomized algorithms is the cost for 
stronger capability of bypassing black holes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure3. Packet interception probability vs N        Figure 4. Packet interception probability vs M 
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Figure 5: Packet Interception probability vs Re. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Packet interception probability vs number of nodes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 7: Packet interception probability vs different source location            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Hop count vs N 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
 The proposed key management scheme utilizes the fact that a sensor only communicates with a 
small portion of its neighbors and thus greatly reduces the communication and computation 
overheads of key setup. A public key algorithm – Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is used to 
further improve the key management scheme. The scheme only pre-loads a few keys on each L-
sensor and thus significantly reduces sensor storage requirement. Our performance evaluation 
and security analysis showed that the routing-driven, ECC-based key management scheme can 
significantly reduce communication overhead, sensor storage requirement and energy 
consumption while achieving better security than a popular key management scheme for sensor 
networks. 
The simulation results have shown the effectiveness of randomized dispersive routing in 
combating CN and DOS attacks. By appropriately setting the secret sharing and propagation 
parameters, the packet interception probability can easily be reduced by the proposed algorithms 
to as low as 10¡3, which is at least one order of magnitude smaller than approaches that use 
deterministic node-disjoint multi-path routing. At the same time, we have also verified that this 
improved security performance comes at a reasonable cost of energy. 
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